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Case No. 18315 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this action, plaintiff seeks unemployment compensa-
tion benefits under the Utah Employment Security Act, § 35-4-1 
et seg., Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 1 
DISPOSITION IN ADMINI~TRATIVE REVIEW PROCEEDINGS 
On August 6, 1981, 2 plaintiff was prevented by his 
employer from reporting to work and was advised his termination 
was in progress. Plaintiff was officially terminated from his 
.J' 
job as an air traffic controller at the Salt Lake International 
!Hereinafter, reference to the Utah Code Annotated will 
be by "U.C.A.", followed by designation of the appropriate sec-
tion thereof. 
2All dates herein are in 1981 unless otherwise indicated. 
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Airport effective September 15. On August 27, plaintiff ap-
plied for unemployment insurance benefits. On September 18, 
plaintiff's application was denied under u .C.A. § 35-4-5 (b) (1) 
and (d). On October 13, plaintiff appealed. On December 30, 
Appeal Referee Stanley H. Griffin affirmed the denial of plain-
tiff's application for benefits under U.C.A. § 35-4-S(a) and 
(d). The appeal referee did not rely in any part upon U.C.A. 
§ 35-4-S(b) (1) in so ruling. On January 8, 1982, plaintiff 
appealed Referee Griffin's decision to the Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment 
Security (hereinafter the "Board of Review") • In a decision 
dated February 16, 1982, the Board of Review (member Richard H. 
Schone separately concurring) affirmed the Appeal Referee's 
decision. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 35-4-lO(i), plaintiff filed his 
Petition for Writ of Review herein on March 15, 1982. On June 
24, 1982 plaintiff filed his opening brief. On August 20, 1982 
defendants filed t~eir brief~ Plaintiff now replies to defen-
dants' arguments. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board 
of Review affirming the denial o~ unemployment benefits to 
plaintiff. Plaintiff asks the Court to direct the Department 
of Employment Security to grant him unemployment benefits and 
award him costs and attorneys' fees incurred in his appeals. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff does not wish to supplement the Statement of 
Facts contained in his opening brief. Facts relied upon in 
support of plaintiff's reply to defendants' arguments will be 
set forth in the Argument portion of this brief below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS, UNSUPPORTED BY 
ANY EVIDENCE OR ADEQUATE FINDINGS AND UN-
REASONABLE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff does not contest the general statements in 
defendants' brief concerning standard of review applicable to 
Industrial Commission decisions on issues of fact. However 
here, the underlying facts are basically undisputed, leaving 
only legal issues of statutory interpretation and application, 
which are fully reviewable by this Court under U.C.A • 
.. 
§ 35-4-10 (i). In any event, if ever there was a case where a 
decision was arbitrary, capricious, totally unsupported by the 
record and procedurally irregular, this is that case. Def en-
dants virtually concede as much Q}1 the admissions in their 
.... 
brief. 
In the statement of facts at pages 3-5 of their brief, 
defendants admit that "[p]laintiff informed Mr. Lee that he was 
prepared to come to work" on August 6; that later in the day 
plaintiff told Lee " ••• he would report for duty ••• "; that 
plaintiff n. • • did report later in the evening around 11:30 
p.m •••• "; that "[u]pon presenting himself to the supervisor, 
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Plaintiff was told that an intent to terminate was in progress 
and he should leave the facility immediately • n (emphasis • • 
added); that "[o]n August 9, 1981, a letter was sent to Plain-
tiff informing him of an intent to remove him from his position 
as air traffic controller ••• "; and finally that "[c] onse-
quently, Plaintiff was informed by a letter dated September 8, 
1981 that he was officially terminated effective September 15, 
1981." (emphasis added). Further, at page 7 of their argument, 
after stating that the issue is whether the facts show a dis-
charge or a "voluntary quit", defendants state, n • • • it is 
undisputed that the claimant was discharged 
added)! 
• • • 
n (emphasis 
Although there appear to be no Utah cases discussing 
the distinction between a voluntary quit and a discharge, 
U.C.A. § 35-4-5 itself draws that distinction, and for good 
reason. If the employee tells his employer "I quit", under 
subsectior' (a) the l'"1rden is on the employee to establish "good 
cause" or else the employee can be penalized by loss of unem-
ployment benefits. But if on the other hand, as here, the em-
ployer says, "You're fired", the burden is on him to establish 
much more than good cause for thai~decision. Under subsection 
(b) (1), the employer must establish "deliberate, willful or 
wanton" conduct before the employee may be penalized. Thus, 
the issue here is whose act terminated plaintiff's employment. 
The only evidence is that it was the employer's act. At .!!.£ 
point did plaintiff ever evidence an intent to quit his 
employment. 
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Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that 
plaintiff intended, or knew or had reason to know that his 
actions would result in termination. As conceded by defen-
dants, plaintiff knew he had an "amnesty" until at least 8:00 
a.m. on August 6. After speaking with Lee, he knew he had un-
til at least 9:00 a.m. to report to work and reason to believe 
that Lee could grant further extensions of the amnesty. If 
plaintiff knew he was no longer employed, if he intended to 
quit his job, there would have been no reason for him to report 
for work at 11:30 p.m. Then, when he did report, fully expect-
ing and desiring to resume his duties, he was ordered off the 
job! Whether his employer had good cause for this discharge of 
plaintiff is a different issue, to be decided in a different 
forum. However, there is no question that this was an involun-
tary discharge and not a voluntary quit. The statement in the 
Board of Review's main opinion that "the claimant's indecision 
was in effect a decision" (R.0016) punishes co· duct clearly not 
intended to be punished by § 35-4-S(a). 
In Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of the State of Utah, 568 P.2d 727 (Utah 
~ 
1977) this Court stated that the overall purpose of the Employ-
ment Security Act is " ••• to cushion the effect of unemploy-
rnent " Id. at p. 730. Therefore the Court adopted the • • • 
position that those portions of the Act removing eligibility 
for benefits should be strictly construed as penalties or 
forfeitures: 
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[A] n ambiguous or doubtful term should be 
given a construction which is least likely 
to work a forfeiture. The penal character 
of the provision should be minimized by ex-
cluding, rather than including, conduct not 
clearly intended to be within the provi-
sion. Id. (emphasis added). 
What the defendants have attempted to do is obvious. 
They knew there was no factual basis upon which to penalize 
plaintiff for "willful, wanton or deliberate" conduct. They 
also knew that they could assess the same penalty by calling 
the discharge something it was not. Although defendants have 
cited no specific court decision that would apply to the facts 
of this case, their brief obliquely refers to anonymous deci-
sions from other jurisdictions, implying that such decisions · 
could justify their actions. However, any such decisions would 
themselves be unreasonable, wrongly decided and cannot be fol-
lowed by this Court in light of Continental Oil. No amount of 
legal legerdemain can turn an apple into an orange simply by 
calling it one. 
The Court may wonder, as plaintiff has wondered, why 
he should receive such treatment from defendants. The reason 
is revealed in the following concurring opinion from the Board 
of Review decision: 
Were this case isolated by itself, there are 
circumstances which might give cause to con-
sideration of the principle of equity and 
good conscience. However, based on the 
overall circumtances for all Air Traffic 
Controllers, I am concurring that this 
claimant be treated the same as his co-
workers. (R.0017, emphasis added). 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thus, plaintiff was not given a fair hearing on the 
individual merits of his case and cannot expect to receive one 
if this case is remanded, rather than decided once and for all 
by this Court. Instead, he is the victim of still another 
label, that of "air traffic controller", which established an 
irrebuttable presumption or predisposition in the minds of the 
defendants that he was to be penalized, regardless of his par-
ticular circumstances. This is truly arbitrariness and capri-
ciousness at their worst. 
This arbitrariness and capriciousness is also demon-
strated by the fact that the findings of the Appeal Referee, 
adopted by the Board of Review, are inadequate to support their 
decision under U .C.A. § 35-4-5 (a). The statute requires not 
just a finding that plaintiff "left work voluntarily without 
good cause"; it also requires a finding as to whether plaintiff 
left work "under circumstances of such a nature that it would 
b~ contrary to equity and good conscience to impose such a dis-
qualification", considering, ". • • the reasonableness of the 
claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions evi-
dence a continuing attachment to the labor market •••• " The 
latter finding does not appear any~here in the record, and it 
is obvious from the above-quoted concurring opinion that the 
Board of Review refused to consider these statutory prin-
ciples! If they had been genuinely considered (beyond mere lip 
service).., the same decision could not have been reached. 
-7-
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The final indication of the unreasonableness of defen-
dants' actions comes from the fact that, after they twice re-
jected the preliminary decision (R.0054) that plaintiff was in 
fact discharged, Argument IV of their brief retreats to the 
position -that plaintiff not only was discharged but that the 
grounds for discharge were "deliberate, willful or wanton" con-
duct. However, this argument is definitely too little, and 
much, much too late. 
POINT II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MAY NOT NOW CON-
TEND THAT PLAINTIFF WAS DISCHARGED FOR A 
"DELIBERATE, WILLFUL OR WANTON ACT" AND 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OR FINDINGS IN SUPPORT 
OF SUCH A CONTENTION. 
The only issue properly before this Court is whether 
plaintiff quit his job. Not only are there no findings by the 
Appeal Referree or Board of Review of "deliberate, willful or 
wa~ton" conduct on the part of plaintiff, but the Appeal 
Referee's rejection (R.0037) of Brant's preliminary decision on 
(R. 00054) this point must be taken as a finding of no such 
conduct. 
... 
For defendants to be asserting this contention for the 
first time now, after not even raising it in their Answer to 
the Petition for Writ of Review, shows the procedural nightmare 
they continue to inflict on plaintiff. Thus, if the result of 
this appeal is a decision that plaintiff did not quit his job, 
but that the case should be remanded for a determination of 
-8-
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whether his discharge was for willful misconduct, the Court can 
be sure of what the decision will be, in light of defendants' 
obvious desire to punish plaintiff for being an air traffic 
controller. As with the issue of whether plaintiff voluntarily 
quit his job, the fact that there is no evidence to support a 
finding of willful misconduct will not present defendants from 
making such a finding. 
From the evidence and findings presently in the rec-
ord, this Court should hold that, as a matter of law, plain-
tiff's discharge was not for willful misconduct. In Continen-
tal Oil, the case which brought about the 1979 amendments to 
u.c.A. § 35-4-5 (b) (1) adding the "deliberate, willful or wan-
ton" standard, the Court was careful to draw a very clear dis-
tinction between this type of conduct and ••• mistakes, er-
rors in judgment '. • • carelessness or negligence • • • Id 
at 730. As characterized by the Board of Review, the worst 
that can b~ said about plaintiff's conduct is that it resulted 
from "indecision". Plaintiff cannot be subjected to a penalty 
or forfeiture on this basis. 
CONCLUSIO~ 
All plaintiff asks from this Court are his rights to a 
reasonable interpretation of statutes designed to protect 
rather than punish him, and a fair and impartial application of 
these st,atutes to facts that are generally not in dispute. 
Plaintiff has received neither in the previous administrative 
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proceedings and cannot expect to receive them in the future, if 
this case is remanded. The Court should rule that, as a matter 
of law, plaintiff was discharged and that the grounds for dis-
charge do not amount to willful misconduct • 
. // 1 ii 
DATED this /'r -day of September, 1982. 
PRINC~E, !.E~·~ 
i 
I ' 
I 
At 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
vers 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
- If 
On this /:11-day of September, 1982, I hereby certify that 
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Reply Brief, to the following parties of 
record: 
Floyd G. Astin/K. Allan Zabel 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
1234 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah l4115 
Mr. Robert Huffine/Mr. Robert Blunk 
Personnel Off ice ARM-16 
Labor Relations Branch 
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Aurora, Colorado 80010 (,· 6-·/ 
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